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Summary findings
Good governance-in  the form of institutions that  governance, as measured by indexes of bureaucratic
establish predictable, impartial, and consistently enforced  quality, corruption, and the rule of law. This negative
rules for investors-is  crucial for the sustained and rapid  relationship strengthens when instruments for aid are
growth of per capita incomes in poor countries. Aid  used to correct for potential reverse causality. It is robust
dependence can undermine institutional quality by  to changes in the sample and to several alternative forms
weakening accountability, encouraging rent seeking and  of estimation.
corruption,  fomenting conflict over control of aid funds,  Recent studies have concluded that aid's impact on
siphoning off scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and  economic growth and infant mortality is conditional on
alleviating pressures to reform inefficient policies and  policy and institutional gaps. Knack's results indicate that
institutions.  the size of the institutional gap itself increases with aid
Knack's analyses of cross-country data provide  levels.
evidence that higher aid levels erode the quality of
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Recent  studies of aid and economic  growth  have found that aid has a positive and
significant  impact  only in countries  with sufficiently  reformed  policies  and institutions  (Burnside
and Dollar, 1997). This study examines  a different  but related  issue:  does aid influence  the
quality of governance? Analyses  of cross-country  data provide  evidence  that higher aid levels
erode the quality  of governance,  as measured  by indexes  of bureaucratic  quality,  corruption,  and
the rule of law. This negative  relationship  strengthens  when instruments  for aid are used to
correct  for potential  reverse  causality,  and is robust  to changes  in the sample  and to several
alternative  forms of estimation. Section  2 summarizes  previous  arguments  in the literature  on
how aid can improve  or impair  the quality  of governance. Section  3 describes  the data.
Empirical  evidence  is presented  in section  4, including  results of various  robustness  exercises.
Policy implications  are briefly outlined  in section  6.
2.  How Aid Can Influence  Governance
"Windfall"  revenues  from foreign  aid, favorable  shifts in the terms of trade, and abundant
natural  resources  would seem to provide  opportunities  for economic  growth  and development
unavailable  to other countries. However,  the well-known  "Dutch  disease"  phenomenon  suggests
that natural resource  exports have counteracting  effects  on growth,  by weakening  the
manufacturing  and agricultural  sectors. Sachs and Warner (1995)  have found  that countries  with
higher levels of primary-product  exports  tend  to have lower  rates  of income growth.
Windfalls  may also reduce  growth  through  other political  channels  entirely  unrelated  to
Dutch  disease  effects. Windfalls--in  the form of natural resources,  foreign  aid, or favorable  shifts
Iin the terms of trade--may  also worsen  the quality of governmental  institutions,  an important
determinant  of investment  levels  and income growth (Knack  and Keefer,  1995;  Mauro, 1995).
This effect  might appropriately  be named "Zairean  disease"  after  the nation in which "decades  of
large-scale  foreign  assistance  left not a trace of progress"  and ennabled  "incompetence,
corruption,  and misguided  policies"  (Dollar  and Pritchett, 1998:  1).
Good  governance--in  the form of institutions  that establish  a predictable,  impartial,  and
consistently  enforced  set of rules for investors--is  crucial for the sustained  and rapid growth  in
per capita  incomes of poor countries  (e.g.,  Keefer  and Knack, 1997). Moreover,  the impact  of
good governance  appears  to be progressive,  with at worst neutral  effects  on the distribution  of
incomes  within  countries,  and some evidence  of egalitarian  effects  on income  distributions
(Knack,  1999). Thus, the question  of foreign  aid's impact  on the quality  of governance  is
potentially  of great importance  for the incidence  of poverty.
Theory is ambiguous  with respect  to aid's impact  on the quality  of governance. There are
several  reasons to expect that aid might  be associated  with improved  governance. Inefficient
institutions  and policies are often  deliberately  chosen by self-interested  leaders  with short time
horizons. But in some  cases low government  revenues  could be a binding  constraint  on the
development  of well-functioning  bureaucracies  and legal systems. Foreign  aid may be devoted
in part in some  nations to improved  training  and increased  salaries  for public  employees,
including  police,  judges and tax collectors. As salaries increase,  more  competent  bureaucrats  can
be recruited  and bribe solicitation  reduced  (Van Rijckeghem  and Weder,  1997). The improved
investment  climate and higher tax collections  in turn produce  additional  revenues,  and improve
the government's  creditworthiness,  reversing  a vicious circle.
2Aid sometimes  takes the form of programs  intended  to strengthen  the legal system,  public
financial  management,  or other aspects  of governance. Transferring  developed-nation
institutions  to less-developed  nations  via technical  assistance  has proven  very difficult,  however.
Judicial  reform  in Haiti by USAID  has been a particularly  expensive  and abject failure.
Sweden's  aid agency  expended  large resources  over 15 years to build Tanzania's  auditing
capacity,  but with no impact on public  sector  accountability,  because  the Auditor  General's
office still does not use auditing firms  to audit government  expenditures  (Brautigam,  2000).
Aid revenues  could be associated  with improved  governance  even if they are expended
entirely  on consumption,  by facilitating  the survival  of reform-minded  governments.  Aid can be
used for adjustment  costs, compensating  groups  favored  under  the inefficient  policy  regime who
lose rents when corrupt  practices  are curbed  by reforms.
As Rodrik (1996:  31), notes,  however,  external  resources  can help  bad as well as good
governments  survive,  by reducing  the cost of doing nothing as well as reducing  the costs of
reforming. By providing  an alternative  source  of revenues,  aid can relieve  pressure  on recipient
governments  to establish  the efficient  policies  and institutions  necessary  for attracting  private
capital. Large-scale  foreign aid was originally  justified largely as a means of overcoming  capital
shortages,  yet many  aid recipients  maintain  policies  that have the effect  of restricting  inflows  of
private capital  (Bauer, 1984:  ch. 3). Similarly,  the end of U.S. aid - which  had been generous  in
the 1950s  -- is often  credited for the Korean  and Taiwanese  reforms  of the 1960s  (Rodrik, 1996:
31). Aid can even increase  political  instability,  by making control  of the government  a more
valuable  prize. Instability  shortens  time horizons,  leading regimes  to grab everything  they can
for themselves  and their supporters  during  their turn in power. For example,  Maren (1997)
3blames Somalia's civil wars on competition for control of large-scale food aid.
Political scientists have argued that aid weakens governmental accountability, by
retarding the development of a healthy "civil society" underpinning democracy and the rule of
law.  The evolution of democracy and the rule of law in the West was critically related to
monarchs' needs for tax revenues, particularly for fighting wars (Karl, 1997: 60).  Elites who
provided monarchs with most of their tax revenues in turn demanded accountability from
government.  Accountability was gradually extended from the elite to the people at large
(Brautigam, 1992). England is the prototypical example, with the Magna Carta and the Glorious
Revolution being two of the most prominent events in the process of increasing accountability of
monarchs to elites, followed eventually by gradual extension of the suffrage' (North, 1990: 113-
14.). Foreign aid may short-circuit these processes in developing countries, by reducing
government's dependence on its citizenry for tax revenues2 (Moore, 1998; Karl, 1997: 57, 190).
The journalist and ex-aid worker Michael Maren (1997: 21, 171) has written extensively on how
large-scale aid "methodically undermined Somalia's civil society" in the 1980s. With high
levels of aid, recipient governments are accountable primarily to foreign donors rather than to
taxpayers: "those with the loudest single voice on revenue and expenditure decisions are
international lending agencies" (Brautigam, 1992: 11).  Meyer (1992) describes the failure of a
series of donor-funded projects, designed to build rural institutions in the Dominican Republic
"The  slower  development  of Spain's  Cortes  relative  to England's  Parliament  in the 16th  and 17th  centuries  may  have
been influenced  by enormous  windfall  revenues  accruing  to monarchs  from New  World  gold  and silver.
2A study  of aid fungibility  by Feyzioglu,  Swaroop  and  Zhu (1998) finds  that much foreign  aid is used for tax
reduction.
4but which served  short-term  donor rather than domestic  needs and undermined  existing
institutions. The payoff to government  officials  of building institutions  according  to donor
specifications  exceeded  their payoff from building  them according  to domestic  demands. When
external  funding  ended,  the new institutions  broke  down.
Foreign  aid can also weaken  the state  bureaucracies  of recipient  governments.  This can
occur most directly  by siphoning  away  scarce  talent from the civil service,  as donor
organizations  often  hire away  the most skilled  public  officials  at salaries  many  times greater  than
those offered  by the recipient-nation  govermment  match (Brautigam,  2000:  40-41;  Brautigam  and
Botchwey, 1998; Dollar  and Pritchett, 1998:  88-89). Particularly  when donors  implement
projects that local governments  would have  undertaken  anyway,  foreign  aid can prevent  local
bureaucracies  from building administrative  capacity: "At times, donors  have hindered  the
creation  of effective  public sectors  because  they saw end runs around local institutions  as the
easiest  way to achieve  project success"  (Dollar  and Pritchett, 1998:  84). As a resident  of
Equatorial  Guinea  described  his country's  neglect  of facility  maintenance  to Klitgaard  (1990:  98):
"Everything  is given  to them, they don't  take care of anything  and don't have  to."
Perhaps  most importantly,  foreign  aid represents  a potential  source  of rents,  with adverse
effects  on the quality  of the public sector  and on the incidence  of corruption. Rent seeking  often
takes the form of increased  public-sector  employment. Aid is commonly  used for patronage
purposes,  by subsidizing  employment  in the public  sector, or in state-operated  enterprises,  as
foreign  aid can provide  funds for government  to undertake  investments  that would  otherwise  be
made by private investors:
Twenty  or so years  ago, donors  willingly  financed  almost anything  in which  the
5government  chose  to try its hand--textile  plants, shoe factories,  steel  mills, and all
sorts of manufacturing.  Not only were developing  world parastatals  financed
through  donor credits and loans; many government  corporations  were created
because  donor financing  was available  (Dollar  and Pritchett, 1998:  74).
In Tanzania,  for example,  large and rising aid levels in the 1970s  and 80s helped  sustain large
government  subsidies  to state-owned  enterprises  and parastatals. Larger  public  sectors  create
more opportunities  for corruption. If public  firms  displace  private investment,  a weakened
private sector  produces  less pressure  on government  to establish  accountable  and transparent
procedures  and institutions.
As rents available  to those controlling  the government  increase,  resources  devoted to
obtaining  political  influence  increase;  thus a "pervasive  consequence  of aid has been to promote
or exacerbate  the politicization  of life in aid-receiving  countries"  (Bauer, 1984:  38). As foreign
aid expand,  workers  face incentives  to reallocate  time from acquiring  knowledge  and skills
specific  to manufacturing,  toward knowledge  and skills useful for obtaining  a share  of aid
revenues. Because  of the crucial  role of the state in allocating aid revenues  (or other  public funds
freed up by the availability  of aid), the private  returns  to acquiring  political  connections  and
lobbying  skills will increase. Talent is reallocated  from productive  to redistributive  activities. 3
Depending  on assumptions  about  the nature  of competition  among  rent-seeking  groups,
increased  consumption  by these groups  could exceed  the windfall revenues,  so that government
resources  available  for productive  public spending  actually fall (Svensson,  forthcoming;  Tomell
and Lane, 1998). Case study evidence  from primary  product exporters  that is consistent  with
these rent-seeking  models is presented  in Tomell and Lane (1998). They note  that several  coffee
3This  problem  also  arose in gold- and silver-rich  16th-century  Spain. See Karl (1997:  35).
6exporters  suffered  deteriorating  current  account  positions  during  the 1975-79  period  of high
coffee prices. Similarly,  they  point out that Nigeria  and Mexico  ran up sizeable  foreign  debt
during  the 1979-82  oil price shocks. In Svensson's  (forthcoming)  model, greater  competition
among  social groups  increases  rent dissipation. Using cross-country  data, he finds that foreign
aid and natural resource  exports  worsen  corruption  in nations  that are more ethnically  diverse
(his proxy for competition).
Sections  3 and 4 below bring  empirical  evidence  to bear  on the theoretically  ambiguous
relationship  between  foreign  aid and  the quality of governance. This evidence  strongly  supports
pessimistic  predictions  regarding  aid's impact.
3.  Data on Foreign  Aid and the Quality  of Governance
The quality  of governance  is measured  by subjective  indexes  from the International
Country  Risk Guide  (ICRG),  a commercial  service  providing  information  on political  risks  to
overseas  investors  and lenders. These ICRG data have  been previously  used by Knack  and
Keefer  (1995) and others  in explaining  cross-country  differences  in economic  performance.  The
quality of governance  index  from ICRG used here is an 18-point  scale, created  by summing  the
following  three 6-point  scales:  corruption  in government,  bureaucratic  quality,  and the rule of
law. 4 The criteria  used by ICRG in coding  these  measures  are detailed  in the Appendix.  The
rationale  for corruption  and  bureaucratic  quality is obvious. The rule of law definition  indicates
that this measure  reflects  the government's  administrative  capacity  in enforcing  the law, as well
4Brautigam  and Botchwey  (1998)  report  a simple correlation  of -.12 between  aid/GNP  and  this index  for 31 African
countries,  using data only for a single  year (1990).
7as the potential  for rent seeking  associated  with weak legal systems  and insecure  property  rights.
The ICRG index is available  for the years 1982  through  the last year for which aid data are
available,  1995.
8Two alternative  measures  of aid intensity  or dependence  are used here: "official
development  assistance"  as a percentage  of GNP, and as a percentage  of government
expenditures.  Data are available  for the years 1975-95  from the 1998 World  Development
Indicators,  based on aid data provided  by the OECD's Development  Assistance  Committee.
Most analyses  of the impacts  of aid use aid as a percentage  of GNP  (e.g. Boone, 1996)  or GDP
(Burnside  and Dollar, 1997). Several  of the arguments  on aid's impact  on governance  outlined
above  suggest  that aid as a percentage  of government  expenditures  would  be perhaps  an equally
valid measure of aid dependence. 5 Aid/GNP  and aid/government  expenditures,  averaged  by
country  over the 1982-95  period,  are correlated  at .64. Tests  below  will report results using  both
measures. Aid/GNP is available  for more countries,  and there are fewer gaps in the time series,
for countries  with some  data available  on both measures.
"Official  development  assistance"  (ODA)  includes grants,  and loans  with a grant element
of more  than 25 percent. Burnside  and Dollar (1998)  and Svensson  (forthcoming)  use a newer
data set, constructed  by Chang  et al. (1999),  which includes  only the grant component  of loans.
Chang  et al. in their measure  of "effective  development  assistance"  (EDA)  make several
adjustments  intended  primarily  to reflect more accurately  the real cost to donors  of providing  aid,
a concept  which is not of concern  to this analysis. In particular,  grants  tied to technical
assistance  were excluded  from EDA,  because of the quid pro quo nature  of such aid. Technical
assistance,  however, could  have important  effects  on the administrative  capacity of recipient
SBauer  (1984)  asserts that aid/government  expenditures  is more  appropriate  than aid per capita, because  "aid  goes to
governments,  not people." Moore (1998)  defines  aid dependence  as a characteristic  "not of economies  but of
governments."  Klitgaard  (1990:  21) suggests  (partly)  facetiously  that the most relevant  measure  might  be aid per
cabinet  minister.
9governments.
Although  results reported  below  are based on ODA  rather  than EDA  data, all of the
findings  are robust  to the use of EDA. As a share  of national  income  averaged  over the 1982-95
period,  EDA  and ODA are correlated  at .96.
4. Empirical  Evidence
If aid dependence  erodes  the quality  of governance,  then countries  with higher aid levels
should  exhibit  declining  scores  on the ICRG  index  over time, relative  to other  countries.
Accordingly,  the dependent  variable  analyzed  is the end of period (1995)  ICRG  value minus  the
initial (1982  for most countries,  and 1984  for most others)  value.
Figures  1 and 2 display  the simple  correlation  between  the ICRG index  change  and,
respectively,  aid/GNP  and aid/government  spending. Table 1 presents  summary  statistics  for the
ICRG  index  and the aid variables. The last two rows of Table 1 present  summary  statistics  for
aid/government  spending  with and  without  Guinea-Bissau.  The latter  country  is omitted  from
Figure  2 and from all tests reported  below  in which  aid/government  spending  is used, because  it
is an extreme  outlier  on that variable. 6
Figures  3 and 4 display  partial  correlations  between  aid and changes  in ICRG,  controlling
for other determinants  of changes  in institutional  quality. These  determinants  include the initial
ICRG  value,  and changes  over the period  in GDP and in population  (expressed  as a fraction  of
their initial  values).
6Note  that  aid/govermment  spending  can  and  often  does  exceed  100%,  because  not  all  aid  enters  government
budgets.
10Inclusion of the initial ICRG value captures regression-to-the-mean effects, and controls
for the limited opportunity of highly-rated countries to increase their scores (recall that the ICRG
index has an upper bound of 18). If there are economies of scale in establishing effective
institutions, population increases could be associated with improvements in the ICRG index. 7
Increases in per capita income could improve the quality of governance by increasing tax
revenues, if government funds are a binding constraint.  Higher income levels could also reflect a
greater volume and size of transactions, increasing the benefits of developing institutions such as
commercial codes and their associated adjudication and enforcement mechanisms.  If
institutional quality is inferred by ICRG in part from observations of economic performance,
controlling for changes in per capita income may have the effect of removing spurious changes in
scores. If rapidly-growing countries have increasing institutional quality and low levels of aid,
failing to control for changes in per capita income would build in a spurious negative relation
between aid dependence and the quality of governance.  Population and GDP data are taken from
the 1998 World Development Indicators. 8
The quality of governance may be influenced by numerous other factors such as religious
or legal traditions, or colonial heritage (see La Porta et al., 1998). A convenient implication of
using the change in the ICRG index from 1982 to 1995 as the dependent variable is that factors
such as these which are invariant over very long periods of time are unlikely to matter much. 9 In
' If on the other  hand large  countries  are  "ungovernable"  this  relationship  could  be negative.
9Similar  variables  are also available  from  the Penn  World  Tables 5.6,  but only  through  1992  for most countries.
"This  supposition  was confmned  empirically,  as percent  Muslim,  percent  Catholic,  a former  British  colony  dummy,
and other  culturalhistorical  variables  that  have been  linked  in cross-sectional  studies  to good governance  are not
significant  when  added  to the regressions  reported  below,  and do not affect  the aid coefficients.
11contrast,  it is unlikely  that the quality of governance  would  have fully adjusted  to aid dependence
already  by the beginning  of the sample  period considered  here. Aid is largely  a post-war
phenomenon,  and is relatively  non-persistent,  with some  recipients  eventually  becoming  donors.
Results  using OLS are presented  in equations  1 and 2 of Table  2, which  test the effects  of
aid/GNP  and aid/government  spending,  respectively,  on the quality of governance. A very
strong  regression-to-the-mean  effect is found:  other  things equal, a country  with an initial ICRG
value 1 unit greater  than a second  country  will experience  a decline  of about  three-quarters  of a
point. Changes  in population  have no significant  effect. Increases  in GDP per capita are
associated  with improvements  in the ICRG index;  this effect is significant  in the larger sample
(equation 1,  with aid/GNP),  with each 10%  increase  in income associated  with a one-fifth  point
increase  in the quality of governance  index.
Aid coefficients  are negative  and highly significant. A one standard  deviation  change in
aid (using  either  aid measure)  is associated  with a .25 standard  deviation  change  in the dependent
variable,  which  exceeds  the effect of a standard  deviation  change  in per capita income. The aid
coefficient  in equation 1 indicates  that a 15 percentage  point rise in aid's share  of GNP reduces
the ICRG index by 1 point. The aid coefficient  in equation  2 indicates  that a similar impact  is
felt when aid as a share  of government  spending  rises by 35 percentage  points. Such increases  in
aid, while large, are well within the observed  range  of aid values in the sample. Aid explains a
substantial  part of the variation  in the dependent  variable:  omitting  aid from equation I reduces
R 2 from .55 to .45; in comparison  omitting  the change  in per capita income  instead  reduces  R2
from .55 to .50.
12Alternative  Estimation  Procedures
The partial  plots in Figures  3 and (especially)  4, corresponding  to equations  1 and 2
respectively,  provide  little indication  that the major findings  are driven  by a small number  of
outliers. These impressions  are confirmed  by the results of median  and robust  regressions,  which
reduce  the influence  of outliers. Robust  regression  estimation  produces  regression  coefficients
(and standard  errors)  of -.058 (.021)  for aid/GNP  and -.027 (.009)  for aid/government  spending.
Corresponding  estimates  from median  regression  are -.049 (.022)  for aid/GNP  and -.024 (.011)
for aid/government  spending.
If the ICRG  variables  are viewed  as only ordinal  and not cardinal  measures,  then ordered
logit would  be the preferred  estimation  method.'" Ordered  logit estimates  turn out to be very
similar  to OLS  estimates:  coefficients  (and  standard  errors)  for aid/GNP  and aid/government
spending  are -.052 (.018)  and -.024 (.009)  respectively.
Aid coefficients  in equations  1 and 2 conceivably  reflect endogeneity  bias: if donors
direct  aid toward  countries  experiencing  deteriorations  in the quality  of governance,  OLS
estimates  will overstate  the adverse  impact  of aid on governance. Controlling  for need as
measured  by changes  in per capita income,  it is perhaps  more plausible  that donors  reward
nations  with improving  institutional  quality,  as these arguably  are the countries  less likely to
waste  whatever  aid they receive. This latter  argument  suggests  that equation  I and 2 estimates
actually  understate  the true adverse  impact  of aid on governance. Equations  3 and 4 address
these endogeneity  issues through  two-stage  least squares  estimation.
'0There  are 16  different  values  for ICRG  index  changes  observed  in the sample.
13Exogenous instruments for aid are nearly identical to those used by Burnside and Dollar
(1997).  Infant mortality in 1980, and initial GDP per capita, are good indicators of recipient
need.  Initial population"' a Franc zone dummy, and a Central America dummy are measures of
donors' interest.  Of these instruments, infant mortality is easily the most important predictor of
aid.  These instruments not only predict aid very well, but are also valid: p values for tests of
overidentifying restrictions in equations 3 and 4 are .52 and .81 respectively.' 2
Coefficients for each aid measure remain negative and statistically significant using
2SLS, as shown in equations 3 and 4.  The estimated impact of aid roughly doubles, relative to
equations I and 2.  These results are consistent with the view that, controlling for changes in
recipient need as measured by per capita income changes, donors direct aid towards countries
with improving rather than deteriorating institutional quality.
These estimates imply that aid's impact on the quality of governance potentially has
serious consequences for economic growth.  Based on the 2SLS coefficients for aid, a 20
percentage point rise in aid as a share of GNP (or 50-point rise in aid/govemrnment  spending) is
estimated to reduce the ICRG index by about 3 points.  A Barro-type growth regression (for
1980-92) indicates that a decline of that magnitude in the 18-point ICRG index is associated with
a I percentage point drop in the average annual rate of per capita income growth. Of course aid
may influence growth through non-govemance channels, and its net impact on growth may well
"Smaller  countries  tend  to receive  proportionately  more  aid, as  donors  want to "show  the  flag"  widely. Another
explanation  for  smaller  countries  receiving  proportionately  more  aid  is suggested  by Lundborg's  (1998)  finding  that
aid from  the US and  USSR  influenced  (and  was  influenced  by)  votes  in the  UN General  Assembly.  Because  each
country  regardless  of size  has  one  General  Assembly  vote,  an efficient  vote-buying  strategy  would  target  small
countries.
2Burnside  and  Dollar  (1997)  also use arms  imports  as  a fraction  of total  inports  as an  instrument.  Adding  it to
those  used  here  has only  trivial effects  on the  estimates,  but  reduces  the  sample  by  several  countries.
14be positive.
Table 3 replicates  the OLS regressions  from Table 2, substituting  as the dependent
variable  changes  in each of the three separate  components  of the ICRG index. Correlations
among  these three dependent  variables  range from .52 to .68,13  not so high that  the strength  of the
aid-governance  relationship  could not vary substantially  across  the three governance  indicators.
Table 3 contains  a few notable differences  from the findings  in Table  2. Population  increases  are
associated  with improving  bureaucratic  quality,  but are unrelated  to changes  in the rule of law or
corruption  in government.  Per capita income is associated  with improving  bureaucratic  quality
and the rule of law,  but is unrelated  to changes  in corruption. Similarly,  aid levels are
significantly  related  to the former  two index components  but not to corruption.  The bottom  row
of Table 3 presents  2SLS  coefficients  and standard  errors for the aid variable,  using the same set
of instruments  as in Table  2. In these tests, changes  in each of the three index  components,
including  corruption,  are all significantly  and inversely  related  to aid levels.
Robustness to Sample and Specification Changes
Results from Table 2 are robust to reasonable  changes  in the sample. Row 1  of Table 4
reproduces  the aid coefficients  and standard  errors from equations  1 and 2 of Table  2, for
comparison  purposes. Succeeding  rows show  the corresponding  results  for aid, for various
alternative  samples.
A handful  of oil exporters  and other relatively  wealthy  countries  with extremely  small, or
even negative,  values  for net aid disbursements  were deleted  from the sample  examined  in Table
'3Cronbach's  alpha  for  the 3-variable  index  is .80,  indicating  high  reliability.
152. These countries  include  the Bahamas,  Bahrain,  Cyprus,  Greece,  Korea, Kuwait,  Singapore,
Brunei,  Hong Kong, and Saudi Arabia  (the latter 4 are missing  data on aid/government
expenditures  anyway). South  Africa received  small amounts  of aid, and only beginning  in 1993,
so was also deleted. Because  there is inevitably  some arbitrariness  in the selection  of countries
to delete, it is worth adding  them all back in to determine  whether  or not results  are affected  by
their deletion. The "extended  sample"  results in row 2 of Table  4 indicate that aid coefficients
rise marginally in absolute  value.
Row 3 deletes  from  the basic sample  a handful  of countries  with initial population  below
one million,  to ensure  that results  are not driven by a small number  of relatively  unimportant
countries.' 4 Aid coefficients  rise somewhat  in absolute  value,  relative to the basic sample  case.
Row 4 of Table  4 deletes  from the basic sample  all countries  with initial per capita
incomes  of $4000  or greater.' 5 Coefficients  are marginally  lower  than in the basic  sample  case,
but remain statistically  significant  in all four regressions. Row 5 deletes all countries  with
incomes  less than $2000,  again with little change  in results.
Results of regressions  that include only high-aid  countries  are reported in row 6. These
samples  include only the 40 nations  with aid/GNP  averaging  5 percent  or more, and only the 33
nations  with aid/government  expenditures  averaging  15 percent  or more. Aid remains
significant,  with very small changes  in the size of coefficients.
14These  small countries  are Gabon,  Gambia,  Malta, Guinea-Bissau,  and Guyana. The latter  two are missing  data on
aid/government  expenditures  and appear  only in the aid/GNP  tests in Table 1.
"These middle-income  countries  include  Gabon, Israel,  Malta, Oman,  and  Trinidad.
16Row 7 deletes countries which were Communist over most or all of the period.' 6 Many
of these received no aid until after 1990, late in the sample period.  Aid coefficients drop by
roughly one fifth, relative to the basic sample tests, but remain significant in every case.
Row 8 of Table 4 examines only sub-Saharan Africa. Even with a drastic reduction in
sample size, aid/GNP remains statistically significant. This result is of interest for two reasons.
First, it demonstrates that the negative impact of aid is not merely the product of inter-continental
variation; variations in aid within Africa matter for the quality of governance.  Second, Africa is
the most important single region in examining the impact of aid, because it is far more aid
dependent than other regions.
A final sample change, not shown in Table 4, includes Guinea-Bissau in regressions
using aid/government spending, a variable on which that nation is an extreme outlier."'
Coefficients for aid/government spending decline, but standard errors do also, and it remains
statistically significant.
The bottom row of Table 4 examines the impact of technical assistance only, which
constitutes a little more than one-fifth of all aid in the sample. Coefficients for technical
assistance are several times greater than those for aid overall, consistent with arguments stressing
the undennining of local expertise and administrative capacity. 18
6These socialist  countries  include  Albania,  Bulgaria,  China,  Hungary,  Poland,  Romania,  and  Vietnam  (the  latter  is
missing  data  on aid/government  spending).
'7Guinea-Bissau  is included  in all  regressions  using  aid/GNP,  and  it does  not even  represent  the  maximum  value  for
that  variable.
1  8Aid  exclusive  of  technical  assistance  is also  significantly  associated  with  declining  quality-of-governance  scores,
with  coefficients  and  standard  errors  very  similar  to those  for  aid  overall.  When  technical  assistance  and  the
remainder  of aid  (which  are  correlated  at .87)  are  included  together,  only  the  former  is significant.
17Conceivably, aid has some positive effects on the quality of governance that are captured
by the control variables.  Suppose aid increases per capita income, which in turn improves
institutional quality.  Controlling for changes in per capita income could then bias the aid
coefficients downwards.  However, aid is not correlated with improvements in income in other
studies (Burnside and Dollar, 1997). Moreover, omitting the change in per capita income as a
control variable does not substantially alter the aid coefficients.' 9
Aid Variability
Aid dependence is measured above by country mean values over the 1982-95 period. If
aid is highly variable over time within a country, dependence might be lessened in the sense that
aid cannot be relied on as a stable source of funds. This reduced reliance could diminish the
harmful impact of aid on the quality of governance.  In Svennson's (forthcoming) model, the
expectation of aid increases rent seeking and corruption.  On the other hand, high aid variability
in a country may indicate that donors have a shorter term, project oriented emphasis that disrupts
existing institutions, replacing them with new ones that collapse when funding ends (Meyer,
1992).
Evidence on aid variability suggests that it tempers rather than reinforces the effects of
aid levels.  Table 5 adds the coefficient of variation of aid, for the aid/GNP specification. 20
Equation 1 shows that, controlling for mean levels of aid, greater variability is associated with
19Similarly,  the  aid  coefficients  are  not  sensitive  to omitting  either  of  the  other  control  variables,  population  change
or  the  initial  level  of the  quality  of  governance.
20There  are  very  few  gaps  in the  data  for  aid/GNP  over  time  within  countries,  unlike  the  case  for  aid/government
spending,  making  it the  preferred  variable  from  which  to construct  a country-level  measure  of dispersion.
18improvements  in the quality  of governance.  A one standard  deviation  rise in the CV of aid is
associated  with a one-third  standard  deviation  increase  in the dependent  variable.
Equation  2 adds an interaction  term, equal to the product  of the deviations  of aid/GNP
and the CV from their sample  means. 21 This interaction  pernits a more  direct test than in
equation  1 of the hypothesis  that the impact  of aid levels on the quality  of governance  depends
on the variability  of aid. The interaction  coefficient  is positive  and significant,  indicating  that  aid
levels  are less  harmful  to the quality  of governance  when  aid is more variable. The size of the
interaction  coefficient  indicates  that the negative  effects  of aid levels disappear  when  the CV is
about  .78, higher  than all but 15 out of 80 values in the sample.
A high CV does not necessarily  indicate  that aid varies  unpredictably;  it could  be the
product  of a strong  and steady  upward  or downward  trend  in aid levels  over time. When
aid/GNP  is regressed  on time for each of the 80 countries,  a significant  time trend is found  in 43
cases,  with 30 positive  and 13 negative. When dummies  for these  two sets of countries  are added
to the regression,  neither  dummy  coefficient  is significant,  and the CV slope  (2.656)  and standard
error (.607)  change  very little from  their values in equation  1. Variability  in aid matters,  but
trends--i.e.,  "predictable  variability"--do  not. Interaction  terms  constructed  from aid/GNP  and
the trend  variables  also are not significant.
Aid and Initial Conditions
Brautigam  and Botchwey  (1998)  argue that the extent  to which aid undermines
21Taking deviations  from means  leaves  the interaction  coefficient  and  standard  error unchanged. The advantage  is
that the coefficient  on the aid level indicates  aid's impact  conditional  on the mean  value  of aid variability,  rather
than a value of zero (which  is below  the minimum  observed  value).
19institutions  "depends  on the pre-existing  quality  of governance."  In this view, aid undermines
institutional  capacity  only where  it is relatively  weak  to begin  with  --  an argument  consistent
with the common  view that the Marshall  Plan was an unambiguous  success. The association
between  high levels of aid and declines  in the ICRG index should  be weaker,  the higher  is the
initial  ICRG index  value, in this view. This hypothesis  is tested  in equations  3 and 4 of Table  5,
using an interaction  term equal  to the product  of the deviations  of aid/GNP  (or aid/government
spending)  and the initial ICRG  index  value from their sample  means. Results  provide no support
for the hypothesis  that initial  conditions  matter,  as neither  interaction  term is significant.
Aid and  Ethnic  Divisions
Svensson  (forthcoming)  found  that higher aid levels  were associated  with more severe
corruption,  but only where the degree  of competition  for rents among  social  groups  was
sufficiently  strong,  as measured  by an index  of ethno-linguistic  fractionalization  (ELF).
Svensson's  analysis  differs  from the current  one in several  ways. He uses  only the corruption
indicator  from ICRG--the  one with the weakest  relation  to aid of the three components  of the
ICRG index  used here. He uses  corruption  levels rather  than changes  as the dependent  variable.
His analysis  includes  three observations  per country,  where  each observation  is averaged  over  a
5-year  period. Standard  errors were adjusted  for country-specific  random  effects.
Evidence  from the cross-sectional  tests here  provide  no support  for the hypothesis  that
ethnic  divisions  exacerbate  the destructive  impact  of aid on the quality  of governance. The
ethnicity  measure  used here is from Sullivan  (1991),  who ascertained  the percentage  of a
country's population  belonging  to the largest  group,  where  groups  are defined  by race, language
20or religion  depending  on which  is determined  to be the most important  source of cleavages. 22
In equations  5  and 6 of Table  5, the homogeneity  index  and interactions  with aid are
added as regressors. Interaction  coefficients  are significantly  negative  in both regressions,
indicating  that the corrosive  impact  of aid dependence  on the quality  of governance  worsens  with
greater  ethnic  homogeneity. The estimated  impact  of aid/GNP  (aid/government  spending)  drops
to 0 when the homogeneity  index  equals 27 (43), and is negative  for higher  values of the
homogeneity  index. 23
Natural  Resource  Abundance
Several  of the arguments  in section  2 on aid's potential  impact  on governance  apply  to
windfalls  from other sources,  such as natural  resource  abundance,  as well as to foreign  aid.
Using a "bureaucratic  efficiency"  index from Business International  for the early 1980s  as
constructed  by Mauro (1995),24  Sachs and Warner (1995)  find no relationship  between  primary
product  exports  as a share of GDP and  the quality of governance. Leite  and Weidmann  (1999)
find that higher fuel and minerals  exports  as a share of GDP (in 1970)  are associated  with worse
ratings  on the ICRG corruption  scale  (for the year 1982).
In the framework  of this analysis,  higher levels of natural  resource  exports are associated
22This variable  is also  used by Knack  and Keefer  (1997). Sullivan's  measure  is used here because  it is available  for
all 80 countries  in the basic sample. About  10 observations  are lost using  the ELF  index.
23Interactions  of aid and ELF  produce  positive  but insignificant  coefficients. The Sullivan*aid  interactions  are
significant  even  in the (smaller)  ELF  sample.
24Relative to the ICRG  governance  variables,  the Business  International  data are available  for many fewer  countries
and for many fewer  years.
21with declining  quality  of governance,  but the relationship  is not statistically  significant. 25 The
resource  variable  is the sum of mineral  and fuel exports as a share  of GDP,  averaged  over the
1982-95  period. This and other available  measures  are only highly  imperfect  proxies for
resource  abundance,  for reasons discussed  by Sachs  and Warner  (1995).
6. Policy  Implication's
Recent  studies  have concluded  that the impact  of aid on growth  and infant  mortality  is
conditional  on policy  and institutional  gaps (Dollar  and Pritchett,  1998;  Burnside  and Dollar,
1997, 1998). Results  presented  here  indicate  that  the size of the institutional  gap itself increases
with aid levels.
Policy implications  must be phrased  very tentatively,  pending  additional  research.
Further  analysis  which  disaggregates  aid by source  (e.g. multilateral  vs. bilateral)  may provide
more  insight  into the precise mechanisms  by which  aid appears  to undermine  the quality of
governance. Such  data would  also permit  tests of the hypothesis  that a given  quantity  of aid is
more destructive  when there is a proliferation  of donors  (Brautigamn  and Botchwey,  1998;  Moore,
1998). Finally,  a case-study  approach  should  examine  more closely  the recent  experience  of
high-aid  countries  with deteriorating  institutional  quality,  such as Burkina  Faso,  Guinea-Bissau,
and Somalia,  as well as aid successes  such as Taiwan  and Botswana  (Brautigam,  2000:  49-53).
Findings  of this analysis  suggest  several  possible  policy  approaches.  First, a larger
fraction  of aid could be tied or dedicated  to improvements  in the quality  of governance,  for
25These  results  are not shown  in tables  for space  reasons,  but are available  from the author  on request.
22example,  in the form of programs  to establish  meritocratic  bureaucracies  and  strong,  independent
court systems.  This approach  was advocated  by the Meltzer  Commission's  report  to the U.S.
Congress  on reforming  the IMF,  World  Bank,  and other  international  financial  institutions
(International  Financial  Institution  Advisory  Commission,  2000). Brautigam  (2000:  55)
advocates  greater  selectivity  by donors,  targeting  aid to countries  that  take specific  steps  to
reduce  corruption,  improve  fiscal accountability,  and implement  meritocratic  recruitment  and
promotion  in the civil service.
For recipient  nations  undertaking  these  reforms,  aid should  more  often be provided  in the
form of direct  budgetary  support,  or in the form of debt  relief. If donors  are not designing  and
implementing  projects,  or providing  tied aid and technical  assistance,  recipient  govermnents  may
face greater  opportunities  to build administrative  capacity,  and  to negotiate  with civil society
over service  provision,  if not over revenues.
Donors  should  also attempt  to identify  ways  of depoliticizing  the distribution  of rents
from aid funds. "Selective  allocation  of aid...would  reduce its propensity  to politicize  life, and
thereby  reduce  the extent  and intensity  of political  conflict"  (Bauer,  1984:  61).
Finally,  donors  can devote  greater  efforts  to strengthen  civil society  and its links to
government  (Dollar  and Pritchett,  1997:  58, 116). Recent emphases  on citizen  participation  and
on "social  capital"  within the World  Bank  and  other donor agencies  are consistent  with this
approach. Aid in the form of micro-enterprise  loans  may improve  govermment  accountability  in
the medium  or long term by building  up the private  sector,  thereby  increasing  the demand  locally
for good  governance.  Aid targeted  directly  to the start-up  of small  businesses  is also less
fungible,  and more  difficult  for governments  to expropriate. Making  aid to governments
23conditional  on streamlining  procedures  for starting  up and operating  new businesses  could
reinforce  such policies.
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27Appendix
ICRG  Index (ranges  from  0 to 18)
Corruption  in Government  (0-6)
Lower  scores  indicate  that "high  government  officials  are likely  to demand special
payments,"  "illegal  payments  are generally  expected  throughout  lower  levels of government"  in
the form of "bribes  connected  with import  and export  licenses,  exchange  controls,  tax
assessment,  police  protection,  or loans."
Quality  of the Bureaucracy  (0-6)
High scores  indicate  "an  established  mechanism  for recruitment  and training,"  "autonomy
from  political  pressure,"  "strength  and expertise  to govern  without  drastic  changes  in policy  or
interruptions  in government  services"  when governments  change,  and "established  mechanisms
for recruiting  and training."
Rule  of law (0-6)
This variable  "reflects  the degree  to which  the citizens  of a country  are willing  to accept
the established  institutions  to make and implement  laws  and adjudicate  disputes." Higher  scores
indicate  "sound  political  institutions,  a strong  court system,  and  provisions  for an orderly
succession  of power." Lower  scores  indicate  "a tradition  of depending  on physical force  or
illegal  means  to settle  claims." Upon  changes  in government  new leaders  "may  be less likely  to
accept  the obligations  of the previous  regime"  in low-scoring  countries.
28Table 1
Summary  statistics  for basic sample  used in cross-sectional  analyses
Variable  N  Mean  Std.  dev.  Minimum  Maximum
ICRG Change  80  +2.47  3.38  -6  +10
ICRG, initial  80  7.03  3.30  0  15
Pop. change  / initial  pop.  80  0.33  0.15  -0.06  0.78
GDP change  / initial GDP  80  0.09  0.37  -0.76  1.57
GDP, initial  80  1312  1436  80  7881
Infant  mortality,  1980  80  85.6  46.1  15.1  190.2
Percent  in largest  ethnic  group  80  64.5  25.3  17  100
Aid/GNP,  mean  80  8.7  12.4  0.05  69.1
Aid/govt.  spending,  mean  68  26.3  30.5  0.001  141.8
Aid/govt.  with Guinea-Bissau  69  106.5  666.6  0.001  5557.5
29Table 2
Aid Dependence  and  the ICRG Quality-of-Governance  Index
Equation  Ij|  2  3  |  4
Method  OLS  2SLS
Aid variable  Aid/GNP  Aid/govt.  Aid/GNP  Aid/govt.
Constant  8.475  8.535  9.178  9.044
(0.984)  (1.051)  (1.116)  (1.133)
Initial ICRG index  -0.770  -0.740  -0.766  -0.749
value  (0.083)  (0.087)  (0.092)  (0.093)
Population  change/  -0.640  0.027  -0.484  1.056
initial population  (1.837)  (1.933)  (2.040)  (2.089)
GDP p.c. change/  2.027  1.231  1.757  0.635
initial GDP p.c.  (0.748)  (0.801)  (0.835)  (0.879)
Aid  -0.067  -0.027  -0.154  -0.054
(0.021)  (0.010)  (0.037)  (0.014)
N  80  68  80  68
Mean, dep. variable  +2.45  +2.75  +2.45  +2.75
Adj. R 2 .55  .54  .52  .53
Std.  error of est.  2.29  2.2  2.54  2.33
Dependent  variable  is the ICRG quality-of-governance  index. Standard  errors are in parentheses.
Other  instruments  in 2SLS include  infant  mortality  in 1980,  initial population,  initial GDP  per
capita, a Franc  Zone dummy  and a Central  America  dummy. P values  for tests of
overidentifying  restrictions  in equations  3 and 4 respectively  are .52 and .81. Note R2  does not
have its usual interpretation  in 2SLS.
30Table  3
Aid Dependence  and ICRG Index  Components
Equation  1  lI2  3  |I  4  5  |L6
Dependent  variable  Bureaucratic  quality  Rule of law  Corruption  in govt.
Aid variable  GNP  govt.  GNP  govt.  GNP  govt.
Constant  2.028  2.074  3.730  3.688  2.655  2.750
(0.342)  (0.368)  (0.439)  (0.475)  (0.359)  (0.376)
Initial index  -0.723  -0.705  -0.839  -0.806  -0.710  -0.687
component  value  (0.086)  (0.093)  (0.096)  (0.103)  (0.086)  (0.088)
Pop. change/  initial  0.950  1.532  -0.761  -0.585  -0.902  -1.034
pop.  (0.678)  (0.707)  (0.865)  (0.941)  (0.721)  (0.757)
GDP  p.c. change/  0.736  0.410  0.892  0.670  0.335  0.073
initial GDP  p.c.  (0.280)  (0.298)  (0.337)  (0.369)  (0.301)  (0.327)
Aid  -0.023  -0.014  -0.035  -0.008  -0.010  -0.004
__________________  _(0.008)  (0.004)  (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.008)  (0.004)
N  80  68  80  68  80  68
Mean,  dep.  var.  +0.63  +0.71  +1.34  +1.49  +0.49  +0.56
Adj. R 2 .50  .53  .53  .51  .47  .47
Std. error of est.  0.85  0.82  1.05  1.03  0.91  0.89
Aid (2SLS  estimates)  -0.057  -0.023  -0.068  -0.020  -0.029  -0.012
__________________  (0.019)  (0.007)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.014)  (0.006)
Standard  errors are in parentheses.
31Table  4
Aid Dependence  and the ICRG  Quality of Governance  Index
Robustness  to Sample Changes
Aid variable  Aid/GNP  Aid/government  expenditure
Row #  Sample  OLS  2SLS  OLS  2SLS
1  Basic: 80, 68  -0.067  -0.154  -0.027  -0.054
(0.021)  (0.045)  (0.010)  (0.014)
2  extended  sample:  -0.079  -0.177  -0.029  -0.058
91, 76  (0.020)  (0.036)  (0.009)  (0.014)
3  > 1 million  pop.:  -0.077  -0.190  -0.039  -0.061
75, 65  (0.025)  (0.047)  (0.011)  (0.015)
4  < $4000  p.c.  -0.063  -0.140  -0.026  -0.050
GDP: 75, 63  (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.010)  (0.014)
5  < $2000  p.c.  -0.064  -0.146  -0.023  -0.047
GDP:  64, 54  (0.021)  (0.036)  (0.010)  (0.014)
6  aid/GNP> 5: 40  -0.060  -0.168  -0.024  -0.062
aid/govt.  > 15: 33  (0.030)  (0.063)  (0.015)  (.023)
7  non-Socialist:  -0.057  -0.129  -0.021  -0.044
73, 62  (0.020)  (0.034)  (0.009)  (0.013)
8  Africa only:  -0.074  -0.126  -0.017  -0.035
31, 24  (0.030)  (0.057)  (0.016)  (0.022)
9  Technical  -0.346  -0.699  -0.119  -0.226
assistance  only  (0.089)  (0.159)  (0.044)  (0.059)
Cell entries indicate  coefficients  and standard  errors for aid variables. Dependent  variable is the
change in the ICRG  index, 1982-95. Other  independent  variables  include  the initial ICRG index
level, change  in population  (divided  by initial  population),  and change  in per capita  GDP
(divided  by initial GDP). Other instruments  in 2SLS include infant  mortality  in 1980, initial
population,  initial GDP per capita, a Franc  Zone dummy and a Central  America  dummy. P
values in tests of overidentifying  restrictions  vary from .31 to .89.
32Table 5
Aid Variability, Initial Conditions, and Ethnic Homogeneity
Equation  1  2  3  4  5  6
Aid variable  GNP  govt.  GNP  govt.
Constant  6.097  6.451  8.445  8.675  5.823  4.910
(1.041)  (1.032)  (1.000)  (1.064)  (1.345)  (1.379)
Initial ICRG index  -0.821  -0.808  -0.771  -0.739  -0.762  -0.777
value  (0.076)  (0.074)  (0.084)  (0.088)  (0.078)  (0.080)
Pop. change/ initial  2.516  2.019  -0.574  -0.173  1.393  2.944
pop.  (1.806)  (1.782)  (1.878)  (1.948)  (1.856)  (1.854)
GDP p.c. change/  2.970  2.922  2.028  1.303  1.341  0.804
initial GDP p.c.  (0.707)  (0.692)  (0.752)  (0.806)  (0.737)  (0.716)
Aid (mean)  -0.049  -0.031  -0.065  -0.028  -0.076  -0.029
____  _  ___________  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.023)  (0.010)  (0.022)  (0.009)
Aid, coefficient of  2.569  3.326
variation  (0.593)  (0.685)  _
Aid mean*Aid CV  0.145
________  _(0.070)
Aid*Initial ICRG  -0.002  0.003
(0.008)  (0.003)
Percent in largest  0.029  0.041
ethnic group  (0.011)  (0.011)
Aid*percent in largest  -.0020  -.0012
ethnic group  (.0009)  (.0004)
N  80  80  80  68  80  68
Mean, dep. variable  +2.45  +2.45  +2.45  +2.75  +2.45  +2.75
Adj. R 2 .63  .65  .54  .54  .60  .64
Std. error of est.  2.05  2.30  2.20  2.15  1.94
Standard effors are in parentheses.
33Figure  1
Aid/GNP  and ICRG  Change,  1982-95
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Aid/GNP  and  ICRG  Change  (partial  plot)
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